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CASE COMMENT: MCCAIN V MCCAIN 
AND BARTON V SAUVÉ: A NEW 
APPROACH TO AUTONOMOUS  
DOMESTIC CONTRACTUAL 





This case comment explores the tension between principles 
that guide domestic contractual bargaining and 
interpretation in Ontario with reference to two recent trial-
level decisions. The courts’ analyses in McCain and Barton 
suggest a way to reconcile the apparent tension between 
principles of autonomy and fairness. In light of these 
decisions, and drawing on the literature in this area, the 
paper suggests a two-pronged approach for courts to adopt 
when deciding whether to set aside a domestic contract. 
This approach attempts to ensure that courts only uphold 
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a judicial law clerk at the Superior Court of Justice in Ontario. Upon 
being called to the bar of Ontario in 2019, he worked briefly as an 
Assistant Crown Attorney and is currently Associate Investigation 
Counsel with the Law Society of Ontario. The views and opinions in 
this article are the author’s own and do not reflect the views or policies 
of the Superior Court of Justice, the Ministry of the Attorney General, 
or the Law Society of Ontario. 
 Thank you to Professor Mary Jane Mossman and to my father James 
Cornish, for their edits and suggestions for improvement. Thank you 
also to my mother, Cettina Cornish, who practiced family law for over 
ten years, for her inspiration and insight. 
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The 1975 decision of Dal Santo v Dal Santo1 provides a 
clear and succinct statement of the underlying policy for 
domestic contracts:2 “It is of great importance not only to 
the parties but to the community as a whole that contracts 
of this kind should not be lightly disturbed.”3 Drawing on 
this policy, the law in Ontario effectively prioritizes the 
primacy and finality of domestic contracts, making them 
prima facie enforceable with the onus on the party wishing 
to set the contract or a provision thereof aside pursuant to 
criteria set out in s 56(4) of Ontario’s Family Law Act 
(FLA).4 This framework gives rise to the question: what is 
the appropriate balance between the principles of private 
autonomy and overall fairness in the context of domestic 
contractual bargaining? This paper will consider this 
question in the context of two Ontario Superior Court of 
Justice decisions: McCain v McCain5 and Barton v Sauvé.6 
Drawing on these cases, the paper offers a two-pronged 
 
1  (1975), 21 RFL 117, 1975 CarswellBC 45 (BCSC) [Dal Santo cited to 
RFL]. 
2  For the purpose of this paper, the term “domestic contracts” is meant 
to cover marriage contracts and cohabitation agreements, but not 
separation agreements. In Ontario, these terms are defined by ss 52, 53, 
and 54 of the Family Law Act, RSO 1990, c F3 respectively. As such, 
this paper focusses on contracts made before or during a relationship—
i.e., not at its end. 
3  Dal Santo, supra note 1 at para 16. 
4  Family Law Act, RSO 1990, c F3 [FLA]. 
5  2012 ONSC 7344, 34 RFL (7th) 82 [McCain]. 
6  2010 ONSC 1072 [Barton]. 
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inquiry for courts in Ontario to consider to ensure that 
parties involved in domestic contractual bargaining were 
indeed autonomous. This determination would, in turn, 
assist courts in deciding whether to set aside a particular 




Both McCain and Barton were decided in the context of a 
tension between two principles that appear to be at odds 
with each other: autonomy and fairness. Autonomy is 
understood as the right and ability to make one’s own 
decisions and to have those decisions respected and upheld 
by others.7 Fairness is the act and process of treating people 
equally or in a way that is right or reasonable, usually with 
reference to an ostensibly objective set of criteria. 
 
 For the purposes of this paper, judicial decisions 
that respect parties’ autonomy would uphold their domestic 
contracts. Decisions that espouse fairness would more 
readily intervene and even set aside domestic contracts 
where the court finds that one party did not treat the other 
procedurally fairly or because the domestic contract results 
in an ostensibly unreasonable or unjust substantive 
outcome. 
 
 As such, in the context of domestic contracts, 
fairness can be broken down into two categories: 
procedural fairness and substantive fairness. The Supreme 
Court of Canada understands procedural fairness as 
 
7  For the purpose of this paper, the most significant of those “others” are 
courts. 
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ensuring that the process of negotiation and execution of 
agreements is fair. The court should ensure that neither of 
the bargaining parties are vulnerable8 vis-à-vis the other 
party or, if one party is indeed vulnerable, that the other 
party did not take advantage of that vulnerability.9 In this 
vein, procedural fairness would include the opportunity 
and ability to negotiate, the provision of full financial 
disclosure on behalf of both parties, the absence of threats 
or pressure, and the presence of independent legal advice. 
 
 Substantive fairness is achieved when “the 
substance of the agreement, at formation, complied 
substantially with the general objectives of the [Divorce 
Act10 or FLA].”11 As such, the more a domestic contract 
deviates from the objectives or anticipated outcomes of the 
relevant Act, the less substantively fair it is.12 However, a 
domestic contract that so deviates may, and should, still be 
viewed as substantively fair if there is a valid reason or 
justification for it, such as if one party gives up something 
 
8  “Vulnerable” meaning significantly physically, mentally, emotionally, 
or financially inferior to the other bargaining party. 
9  See Rick v Brandsema, 2009 SCC 10 at para 42 [Rick], citing Miglin v 
Miglin, 2003 SCC 24 at para 4 [Miglin]. 
10  Divorce Act, RSC 1985, c 3 (2nd Supp). 
11  Rick, supra note 9 at para 42. 
12  For example, a domestic contract that splits a married couple’s net 
family property in Ontario five percent to one spouse and nintety-five 
percent to the other would very likely be considered substantively 
unfair because it differs significantly from the equal (i.e., 50–50) 
property sharing regime established in s 5 of the FLA. 
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to which they would be statutorily entitled in exchange for 
a benefit they would not otherwise have.13 
 
 Two appellate-level judgments serve as 
exemplifications of these two principles. The majority 
decision in Hartshorne v Hartshorne14 is driven by 
autonomy interests while the decision in LeVan v LeVan15 
promotes fairness. 
 
 In Hartshorne, a wife, after obtaining independent 
legal advice, signed a marriage agreement on her wedding 
day.16 The agreement significantly limited her entitlement 
to property sharing in the event she and her husband 
separated in the future.17 The Supreme Court of Canada 
upheld the marriage contract, despite it being signed in a 
jurisdiction where the legislation specifies that the courts’ 
role in division of assets on marital breakdown is fairness 
(i.e., British Columbia).18 Bastarache J, for the majority, 
stated: 
 
13  For instance, a contract where one spouse that agrees to partake in only 
25 percent of the couple’s net family property in exchange for being 
made a joint tenant owning a portion of the matrimonial home equal to 
their spouse could, depending on the value of the home, be viewed as 
substantively fair. 
14  2004 SCC 22 [Hartshorne]. 
15  2008 ONCA 388 [LeVan]. 
16  See Hartshorne, supra note 14 at paras 2, 6. 
17  See ibid at paras 5–6. 
18  See ibid at para 13. 
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[I]n a framework within which private parties 
are permitted to take personal responsibility 
for their financial well-being upon the 
dissolution of marriage, courts should be 
reluctant to second-guess their initiative and 
arrangement.19 
 Contrast Hartshorne’s emphasis on private 
autonomy with LeVan’s concern for fairness. In LeVan, a 
wealthy future husband wanted his future wife to enter into 
a marriage contract in an attempt to shield his assets in the 
event of separation.20 Although the future wife initially 
received independent legal advice, her future husband sent 
her to a lawyer who had connections to his family.21 The 
Court of Appeal found that the future wife did not receive 
effective independent legal advice and that the future 
husband failed to disclose his assets to his future wife 
pursuant to s 56(4)(a) of the FLA.22 The Court stated: 
Although there is nothing in the governing 
legislation that suggests that fairness is a 
consideration in deciding whether or not to 
set aside a marriage contract, I do not see why 
fairness is not an appropriate consideration in 
the exercise of the court's discretion in the 
second stage of the s. 56(4)(a) analysis. In my 
view, once a judge has found one of [the] 
 
19  Ibid at para 67. 
20  See LeVan, supra note 15 at paras 7, 9–11. 
21  See ibid at para 26. 
22  See ibid at paras 61–62. 
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statutory preconditions to exist, he or she 
should be entitled to consider the fairness of 
the contract together with other factors in the 
exercise of his or her discretion. It seems to 
me that a judge would be more inclined to set 
aside a clearly unfair contract than one that 
treated the parties fairly.23 
 LeVan therefore sets up a two-step process for 
courts to follow when deciding whether to set aside a 
domestic contract in Ontario. The party seeking to have the 
domestic contract or provision thereof set aside must show 
(1) that one of conditions in FLA s 56(4) exists and, if so, 
(2) why the court should exercise its discretion to set the 
domestic contract aside (the LeVan process).24 The court is 
clear that it is possible and appropriate to consider the 
fairness of the domestic contract in the second step of this 
analysis.25  
 
 The Ontario Court of Appeal in LeVan thus reads 
fairness into the exercise of discretion in the FLA s 56(4)26 
whilst the Supreme Court in Hartshorne diminishes the 
role of fairness in the applicable British Columbia 
legislation in an effort to promote individual autonomy. 
Later cases from the Supreme Court of Canada, such as 
 
23  Ibid at para 60. 
24  See ibid at para 33. 
25  See ibid at para 60. 
26  Section 56(4) of the FLA does not identify “fairness” as a consideration 
for setting aside domestic contracts. 
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Miglin v Miglin27 and Rick v Brandsema,28 arguably 
mandate that fairness play a more prominent role when 
courts are deciding whether or not a domestic contract 
should be set aside.29 However, the Supreme Court was 
clear that the guidance in Miglin and Rick is applicable to 
separation agreements only.30 The Supreme Court saw 
separation agreements as requiring a more exacting test for 
review than commercial contracts because they are 
“negotiated between spouses on the fault line of one of the 
most emotionally charged junctures of their relationship—
when it unravels.”31 As such, both Miglin and Rick have 
limited applicability for the purpose of reviewing and 
potentially setting aside domestic contracts.32 
 
 Therefore, Hartshrone and LeVan set up an 
apparent tension between autonomy and fairness33 that 
serves as the backdrop for McCain and Barton. 
 
27  Miglin, supra note 9. 
28  Rick, supra note 9. 
29  See Miglin, supra note 9 at paras 4, 67, 73–75, 82–83; Rick, supra note 
9 at paras 1, 40–44, 49. 
30  See Rick, supra note 9 at paras 39–40. 
31  Ibid at para 40. 
32  “Domestic contracts” as defined in note 2 of this paper. 
33  Other writers have picked up on this apparent tension. See Carol 
Rogerson, “Spousal Support Agreements and the Legacy of Miglin” 
(2012) 31:1 Can Fam LQ 13 at 32 (positing autonomy and fairness as 
principles that are difficult to balance). See also: Lucy-Ann Buckley, 
“Relational Theory and Choice Rhetoric in the Supreme Court of 
Canada” (2015) 29:2 Can J Fam L 251 at 254 (discussing autonomy 
and fairness as an ongoing “debate” and “tension”). 
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FACTUAL AND LEGAL SUMMARY: MCCAIN 
  
In an attempt to preserve his family’s wealth, Mr. 
McCain’s father required that his children enter into 
marriage contracts with their spouses to limit those 
spouses’ entitlement to property and spousal support at 
family dissolution, lest his children be disinherited.34 His 
son (Mr. McCain), an extremely wealthy business man 
worth approximately $500 million dollars, passed on this 
information to his wife (Ms. McCain) approximately 15 
years into their marriage, and after receiving independent 
legal advice, she signed the contract.35 When the parties 
eventually separated (after 30 years of marriage), Ms. 
McCain sought to set aside the provision of the contract 
waiving spousal support and made a claim for interim 
spousal support.36 
 
 Greer J concluded that the contract was 
unconscionable.37 She found that Ms. McCain had little 
choice but to sign the agreement, knowing that her husband 
would be disinherited if she refused to sign.38 Further, she 
held that Ms. McCain was under subtle and psychological 
duress when she signed the marriage contract because her 
 
34  See McCain, supra note 5 at paras 4–6. 
35  See ibid at paras 13, 57, 65. 
36  See ibid at paras 1, 9. 
37  See ibid at para 88. 
38  See ibid at paras 65–66. 
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decision to sign determined whether her husband would 
remain an heir to his father’s fortune.39 
 
 As a result of these findings, Greer J severed the 
provision of the marriage contract that precluded Ms. 
McCain from receiving spousal support and ordered 
support in the amount of $175,000 per month in addition to 
$2.8 million of retroactive spousal support.40 
 
LEGAL AND FACTUAL SUMMARY: BARTON 
 
The parties, Ms. Barton and Mr. Sauvé, entered into a 
cohabitation agreement several months before the end of 
their 8-year relationship.41 They discussed their 
cohabitation agreement at a time when Mr. Sauvé was 
suffering from depression and living on worker’s 
compensation due to a work injury.42 Ms. Barton had 
recently received a $2 million inheritance, which she used 
a portion of to pay off Mr. Sauvé’s debts. She also made 
him the joint-owner of a house she paid for.43 Essentially, 
in return for including him on title for the new home, Ms. 
Barton asked Mr. Sauvé to sign an agreement limiting his 
entitlement to a payment of $70,000 as compensation for 
his contribution to the family home in the event of a 
 
39  See ibid at para 74. 
40  See ibid at paras 75, 103, 108 
41  See Barton, supra note 6 at paras 1, 15. 
42  See ibid at paras 20, 55, 66. 
43  See ibid at paras 10–12, 15. 
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separation.44 When the parties separated, Mr. Sauvé 
applied under s 56(4) of the FLA to set aside the $70,000 
limitation.45 
 
 Blishen J, in upholding the $70,000 limitation as 
stipulated in the agreement, noted that the presence of 
vulnerabilities do not, without more, evince 
unconscionablility, duress or undue influence.46 She 
concluded that although Mr. Sauvé was “a somewhat 
vulnerable party. . . he did receive independent legal 
advice, understood the nature and consequences of the 
agreement and signed it voluntarily.”47 Blishen J framed 
the discussion of the cohabitation agreement and decision 
to have the new home purchased in both parties’ names as 
a true negotiation, and one where Ms. Barton was not 
taking advantage of Mr. Sauvé. The contract was therefore 
not unconscionable, did not involve undue influence, and 
nor was it signed under duress—all of which are 
considerations under s 56(4)(c) of the FLA.48 
 
Blishen J thus upheld the cohabitation agreement’s limited 
allocation of $70,000 to Mr. Sauvé,49 although the court set 
aside the waiver of spousal support in the same agreement 
 
44  See ibid at paras 54, 60. 
45  See ibid at paras 22, 47. 
46  See ibid at para 66. 
47  Ibid at para 67. 
48  See ibid at paras 64–67. 
49  See ibid at paras 71–72.  
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pursuant to s 33(4) of the FLA on the basis that it resulted 




The outcome of the decisions in McCain and Barton 
ostensibly espouse different principles—McCain, in 
setting aside the provision of the marriage contract under 
review, espouses fairness, while Barton, in upholding the 
cohabitation agreement (with the exception of the 
provision waiving spousal support), espouses individual 
autonomy. 
 
 Although McCain does not use FLA s 56(4) to set 
aside the waiver of spousal support, Greer J’s findings of 
unconscionability and duress51 demonstrate that concerns 
about fairness were paramount. She is sensitive to the 
context and underlying power dynamics of the parties at 
the time they signed the agreement. This approach thus 
follows LeVan insofar as Greer J considers fairness in her 
discussion of unconscionability and duress. Indeed, 
fairness has a direct bearing on the outcome of her 
judgment.52 
  
Blishen J in Barton indirectly considers the fairness 
of the agreement as she assesses issues such as the parties’ 
 
50  Ibid at para 87. 
51  See McCain, supra note 5 at paras 65–66, 88. 
52  See ibid at paras 54, 83, 88. See especially: “Even the Husband, in his 
examination, agreed that the Contract was not fair to his Wife. It is 
clear on the face of the Contract that it is unfair, improvident and 
unconscionable.” (Ibid at para 88 [emphasis added]). 
 
208 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 32, 2019] 
 
vulnerabilities and presence of duress.53 However, Blishen 
J ultimately upholds the agreement, which suggests she put 
more emphasis on respecting the individual autonomy of 
the bargaining parties, thus following the Supreme Court’s 
approach in Hartshorne. Indeed, Hartshorne is the first 
case cited by Blishen J in the portion of her judgment 
examining the cohabitation agreement.54 
 
 Notwithstanding the foregoing discussion, an 
examination of Barton that focuses more on the court’s 
reasoning and less on the outcome reveals that concerns 
about fairness were also relevant, if not vital, to Blishen J’s 
decision. For example, she considered the fact that Ms. 
Barton paid off all of Mr. Sauvé’s debts,55 bought a new 
house in joint tenancy with Mr. Sauvé,56 and engaged in 
back-and-forth negotiation about whether to buy the new 
house as joint tenants and what the allocation of funds to 
Mr. Sauvé should be in the event of separation.57 These 
considerations evince that Blishen J was ensuring that both 
parties were treating each other fairly, procedurally, such 
that any power imbalance was mitigated by real, non-
threatening negotiation. This is in contrast to McCain, 
where there was no real opportunity for Ms. McCain to 
negotiate since she was provided with an implicit 
 
53  See Barton, supra note 6 at paras 66–68. 
54  See ibid at para 41.  
55  See ibid at paras 11–12, 18, 67. 
56  See ibid at paras 15–16, 62, 67. 
57  See ibid at paras 54, 67. 
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ultimatum: “you must sign this contract or I [Mr. McCain] 
will divorce you.”58 
 
 Fairness was also key to one aspect of the outcome 
in Barton, namely the issue of spousal support. Blishen J 
turned her mind to Mr. Sauvé’s financial circumstances, his 
financial contributions to the relationship, and the fact that 
he was unable to return to any meaningful employment due 
to physical and psychological disabilities.59 The fact that 
Blishen J highlighted and addressed these concerns by 
setting aside the waiver of spousal support in the agreement 
evince that she was attuned to the circumstances of Mr. 
Sauvé, whom she describes as “a somewhat vulnerable 
party,”60 in an attempt to achieve a substantively fair 
outcome. 
 
 Furthermore, one key factual difference at the time 
the parties signed their respective agreements sheds light 
on how different outcomes were reached in McCain and 
 
58  See McCain, supra note 5 at para 74. Note that although the pressure 
to sign the domestic contract stemmed from Mr. McCain’s father, who 
threatened disinheritance, Greer J (properly) equally attributed the 
pressure to Mr. McCain himself. Mr. McCain could have refused to 
ask his wife to sign the contract and dealt with his father’s threat to 
disinherit him directly, but he did not do. Thus, by asking Ms. McCain 
to sign the contract, to quote Greer J, “the duress was subtle and 
psychological, in that [Ms. McCain] appeared to be the key to [Mr. 
McCain] remaining as one of his father’s heirs. Of course [Mr. 
McCain] did not say ‘you must sign this contract or I will divorce you,’ 
but that was the underlying stake in it all.” 
59  See Barton, supra note 6 at para 87. 
60  See ibid at para 67. 
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Barton.61 That key difference is fear of imminent 
separation in the event that one party does not sign the 
agreement. In McCain, Ms. McCain experienced this fear 
when she “was told that if she did not [sign] the contract, 
the parties’ lifestyle as a family would greatly suffer.”62 
Greer J properly found that Mr. McCain’s implicit message 
to his wife was, “You must sign this contract or I will 
divorce you.”63 Contrast this with Mr. Sauvé’s situation in 
Barton, where the immediate consequence of failure to 
sign the cohabitation agreement was not separation, but 
rather, a refusal to put him on title for the new house Ms. 
Barton was purchasing. Ms. Barton does not threaten the 
relationship whereas Mr. McCain does. 
 
 The disparity between the consequences for failure 
to sign the agreements in each case is a key distinguishing 
factor that courts reviewing domestic contracts must be 
alive to. This is especially so considering that domestic 
contracts are often signed when circumstances between the 
parties are favourable—they are either entering into a new 
and exciting chapter of their life (i.e., marriage) or are 
already happily married or cohabiting. As such, the party 
being asked to sign a domestic contract often does not see 
 
61  Note that I am examining only the circumstances at the time the parties 
signed the agreement that factored into the courts’ analysis in each 
case, and not the position the parties were left in at the time of 
separation. A discussion and analysis of how the courts do and/or 
should handle the resulting circumstances the parties find themselves 
in at the dissolution of the relationship is an important discussion, but 
one that is beyond the scope of this paper. 
62  McCain, supra note 5 at para 6. 
63  Ibid at para 74. 
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the future dissolution of the relationship as a realistic 
possibility—a dissolution which would trigger the 
provisions of a domestic contract that are not in their best 
interest. Similar critiques have been levelled by leading 
family law scholars who argue that assessing the fairness 
of domestic contracts must take into account the power 
imbalances between spouses/cohabiting couples,64 gender 
inequalities, and flaws in the parties’ capacity to contract.65 
While jurisprudence from the Supreme Court of Canada 
has picked up on these nuances in the context of separation 
agreements,66 which have been framed as agreements 
negotiated in an “emotionally charged juncture” of a 
relationship,67 domestic contracts have not been discussed 
in as much detail.68 McCain and Barton evince that the 
more subtle forms of pressure, such as coercion (and even 
duress), at play when parties sign domestic contracts in the 
prime of their relationship warrant the same degree of 
judicial attention as separation agreements—with a focus 
 
64  See Martha Shaffer, “Domestic Contracts, Part II: The Supreme 
Court’s Decision in Hartshorne v Hartshorne” (2004) 20:2 Can J Fam 
L 261 at 280–88. 
65  See Sarah Whitmore, “Deconstructing ‘Economic Man’s’ Application 
to Marriage Agreements: An Analysis of the Method of Contractual 
Enforcement in Hartshorne v Hartshorne” (2010) 29:3 Can Fam LQ 
303 at 315. 
66  See e.g. Rick, supra note 9 at para 41, citing from Miglin, supra note 
9, Lebel J, dissenting: “the law must be sensitive to the ‘social and 
socio-economic realities’ that shape parties’ roles in spousal 
relationships and have the potential to negatively impact settlement 
negotiations upon marriage breakdown.” 
67  Ibid at para 40. 
68  Buckley, supra note 33 at 307. 
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on how heart-shaped glasses, rather than heartbreak, may 
catalyze and manifest as vulnerability. 
 
 Even independent legal advice, which presumably 
would bring the risks of a particular domestic contract or 
provision thereof to the forefront of the party’s mind, is 
often not enough to convince a party to refuse to sign. We 
notice this phenomenon occurring in many of the cases 
cited in this paper (McCain, Barton, and even Hartshorne 
and LeVan) where, despite receiving legal advice, the 
parties signed agreements that they later attempted to have 
set aside. 
 
PROPOSAL: A NEW FRAMEWORK 
 
The courts in both McCain and Barton struggle with 
fairness concerns even though they understand, pursuant to 
the Supreme Court’s comments in Hartshorne and 
Miglin,69 that domestic contracts should not be set aside 
lightly. This struggle may be the product of fairness and 
autonomy being posited as a dichotomy, where one 
principle appears to be in conflict with the other.70 
 
 The courts in McCain and Barton, although not 
expressly saying so, are giving primacy to individual 
 
69  Miglin speaks more directly to waivers of spousal support in separation 
agreements, which are subject to different principles and more exacting 
tests for review, as discussed above in part (2) of this paper. See Miglin, 
supra note 9. Nonetheless, there are portions of Miglin that espouse 
individual autonomy in a manner similar to Hartshorne. See McCain, 
supra note 5 at paras 69–71. 
70  See Rogerson, supra note 33 at 32; Buckley, supra note 33 at 254. 
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autonomy, while ensuring that the parties are on a level 
bargaining plane. If the parties are not on a level bargaining 
plane, the courts review the circumstances to determine 
what, if any, contractual bargaining occurred to ensure that 
no party exploited any inequality in bargaining power 
when the domestic contract was considered and eventually 
executed. Greer J, alive to the pressures Ms. McCain was 
experiencing, including concerns about her husband’s 
inheritance and preservation of the family unit,71 properly 
concluded that Ms. McCain was under duress and that the 
contract itself was unconscionable.72 In other words, Ms. 
McCain was not actually an autonomous bargaining party 
in the circumstances. Blishen J noted that Mr. Sauvé was a 
“somewhat vulnerable party,” but that he was still able to 
bargain with Ms. Barton. She also noted that Ms. Barton 
did not take advantage of his vulnerabilities or unduly 
influence him. Blishen J correctly concluded that there was 
no unconscionability, duress, or undue influence.73 Put 
differently, Mr. Sauvé was an autonomous bargaining 
party vis a vis Ms. Barton. 
 
 As such, Ontario courts may view fairness and 
autonomy not as mutually exclusive principles, but rather 
as two guiding principles to set up a two-pronged analysis 
at the second step of the LeVan process74 for deciding 
 
71  See McCain, supra note 5 at paras 4–6, 65–66. 
72  See ibid at paras 74, 88. 
73  See Barton, supra note 5 at paras 66–68. 
74  I.e., the step where the court considers whether it should exercise its 
discretion to set aside the contract after finding that one of the 
conditions in FLA s 56(4) exists. 
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whether to set aside a domestic contract or a provision 
thereof: (i) that the goal of court, pursuant to the court’s 
policy rationales in Hartshorne and, to a lesser extent, 
Miglin, should indeed be to uphold a domestic contract to 
foster autonomy, but in so doing, (ii) the court must ensure 
the contract is truly the product of two autonomous 
parties.75 It is at this second prong where concerns about 
fairness ought to be considered. More traditional contract 
law concepts that touch on fairness, such as inequality in 
bargaining power, unconscionability, duress, and undue 
influence, would already have been addressed at step one 
of the LeVan process (i.e., under FLA s 56(4)(c)). As such, 
the focus of the second prong of step two of the LeVan 
process would be on procedural and substantive fairness, 
as defined in part (2) of this paper. To ensure the parties 
were truly autonomous, the court would consider whether 
the domestic contract was negotiated in a procedurally fair 
manner and whether the contract resulted in a substantively 
fair outcome for both parties. While there would not, and 
could not, be a definite threshold for a finding of procedural 
or substantive unfairness, the more indicia of either form 
of unfairness, the more likely a court would be to exercise 
its discretion to set aside some or all of the domestic 
contract. 
 
75  To summarize, the two prongs being suggested would fit into the 
LeVan process as follows: the party seeking to have the domestic 
contract or provision thereof set aside must show that (1) one of 
conditions in FLA s 56(4) exists and, if so, (2) why the court should 
exercise its discretion to set the domestic contract aside. Under this 
discretionary second step, the court would undertake a two-pronged 
inquiry to ensure both autonomy and fairness: (i) the court should 
indeed uphold the domestic contract under review to foster autonomy, 
but in so doing, (ii) the court must ensure the contract is truly the 
product of two autonomous parties. 
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 At the second prong where fairness concerns are to 
be taken into account, the court should be particularly 
attuned to the considerations discussed in the final two 
paragraphs of the “Analysis” segment of this paper. This 
includes (a) assessing implicit threats or fears of the 
dissolution of the relationship on behalf of the party being 
asked to sign and (b) recognizing that parties entering into 
a domestic contract are in love or infatuated with one 
another, making them less focused on protecting their best 
interests and more concerned with fostering the 
continuation of their relationship. The party being asked to 
sign may thus be blind to any and all risks they might take 
on when signing a domestic contract, even if they receive 
independent legal advice. 
  
 Further, contextual and structural forms of coercion 
and oppression, such as gender inequality, must also be 
considered by courts at the second prong. This approach 
concurs with suggestions offered by Diana Majury, who 
argues that courts reviewing domestic contracts must be 
“willing to recognize system inequality of bargaining 
power” and adopt a gender-based approach to 
unconscionability.76 I would take Majury’s analysis one 
step further by suggesting that courts not limit assessments 
of systemic inequality to considerations of gender, but 
rather to utilize an intersectional approach that recognizes 
how other systems of oppression, such as racism, 
queerphobia, classism, and ableism, also affect domestic 
contractual bargaining and fairness. 
 
76  Diana Majury, “Unconscionability in an Equality Context” (1991) 7 
Can Fam LQ 123 at 133–34. 
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 For example, consider a closeted LGBTQ+77 
partner who comes from a queerphobic78 family or society 
who wants to remain with their supportive intimate partner. 
Such an individual may not wish to marry their intimate 
partner, given how public the act of marriage is and the 
repercussions that may flow from that act. However, this 
individual’s intimate partner may, instead of getting 
married, wish to enter into a domestic contract mandating 
a property sharing scheme similar to the one imposed on 
married couples under the FLA. The closeted individual 
may be more inclined to sign such a contract, even if it 
would result in a financial disadvantage to them, in an 
attempt to appease their intimate partner, seeing it as an 
alternative to marriage. They may even forgo independent 
legal advice in this circumstance, believing it to be 
unnecessary because they have an otherwise healthy 
relationship or because they do not even want to disclose 
their sexuality/relationship status to a lawyer. A court 
attuned to these nuances of queerphobia and other systemic 
and structural forms of oppression would be better able to 
understand how the domestic contract in this example may 
not have been negotiated in a procedurally fair manner—
the closeted individual’s reluctance to marry or otherwise 
disclose their sexuality/relationship status is likely 
 
77  Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer+ (including, inter alia, 
questioning, intersex, pansexual, and two-spirited individuals). 
78  Defined to concern fear and/or hatred of things and relationships not 
heterosexual and cisgender. 
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inhibiting their ability to negotiate as an autonomous 
party.79 
 
 As such, courts must not only be attuned to duress, 
undue influence, and unconscionability, but also to how 
systemic and structural forms of oppression manifest 
themselves in intimate relationships in ways that are much 
more subtle than in arms-length business transactions.80 
The proposed second prong of the second step of the LeVan 
process provides an apt locus for such considerations. 
 
 This two-pronged approach largely conforms with 
Lucy-Ann Buckley’s conception of a relational-autonomy 
approach to spousal support and property agreements—an 
approach that focusses on “the social situation of the 
individual (including the social connections and pressures 
that may affect personal decision making), and the impact 
of social forces on the development of personal capacities 
for reflection and action.”81 Buckley prefers a relational-
autonomy response to financially disadvantageous or 
manifestly unequal domestic contracts that “holds that 
individuals must be able to reflect critically on equality 
 
79  This is the case notwithstanding that the domestic contract may 
otherwise be substantively fair, if it did indeed mirror the property 
sharing provisions of the FLA. 
80  See Rogerson, supra note 33 at 20. Note that Miglin itself highlights 
these concerns: Miglin, supra note 9 at paras 74–75. As such, courts 
should breathe new life into these paragraphs and strive to give 
primacy to such comments when called upon to decide whether to set 
aside domestic contracts, and not only when deciding whether to set 
aside separation agreements. 
81  Buckley, supra note 33 at 253. 
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norms, even if they ultimately depart from them, and must 
feel that they have a real choice in how they respond to a 
particular situation.”82 The two-pronged approach 
suggested in this paper attempts to achieve this by 
ensuring, at the first prong, that courts understand that 
domestic contracts ought to be respected and upheld to 
preserve parties’ autonomy,83 but also, at the second prong, 
that the bargaining parties were truly autonomous in that 
they had a “real choice” and opportunity to reflect critically 
on equality norms, even if they depart from them in 
executing or choosing not to execute a domestic contract. 
While Buckley has reservations as to how much difference 
a relational-autonomy approach would make in practice to 
spousal support84 and marital property agreement cases,85 
she does end up concluding that it is “normatively 
preferable” in the context of family relationships insofar as 
it vindicates the importance of emotion and connection in 
the decision-making process.86 The two-pronged inquiry 
suggested in this paper simply ensures that courts consider 
and engage with relational autonomy concerns when 
deciding whether to set aside a given domestic contract. 
 
 Presumptions embedded in many of Bastarache J’s 
comments in Hartshorne further underscore the need for 
 
82  Ibid at 266. 
83  Or, to borrow Buckley’s language, to preserve the parties’ “real 
choice[s]” to decide whether or not to depart from “equality norms.” 
See ibid. 
84  Ibid at 298–391. 
85  Ibid at 301–04. 
86  Ibid at 305. 
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this two-pronged approach. Consider comments such as 
“by signing the Agreement, the appellant and the 
respondent entered their marriage with certain expectations 
on which they were reasonably entitled to rely”87 and “in a 
framework within which private parties are permitted to 
take personal responsibility for their financial well-
being.”88 Bastarache J presumes that both parties are fully 
autonomous and able to bargain reasonably and rationally. 
Whitmore makes a similar observation, noting that 
Bastarache J’s analysis assumes that parties conduct “a 
rational cost-benefit analysis to maximize their own 
utilities . . . weigh[ing] these consequences [of relationship 
dissolution] with objective probabilities in mind.”89 If both 
bargaining parties were indeed “factually” autonomous and 
were always capable of conducting “rational cost-benefit 
analyses,”90 then Bastarche J’s comments would be apt and 
appropriate; hence the need to ensure that both parties in a 
given case are indeed autonomous before deferring to the 
parties’ intentions as expressed in a domestic contract. 
 
 This concern to ensure parties’ autonomy concurs 
with a trend in how courts have come to interpret Miglin 
approximately a decade after its release, as observed by 
Carol Rogerson. That interpretation is that “fairly 
negotiated” or “reasonable agreements” should be upheld, 
as opposed to respecting and upholding final agreements 
without qualification.91 This interpretation, insofar as 
 
87  Hartshorne, supra note 14 at para 65. 
88  Ibid at para 67. 
89  Whitmore, supra note 65 at 314. 
90  Ibid.  
91  Rogerson, supra, note 33 at 20. 
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courts may have limited it to separation agreements, can be 
extended to the realm of domestic contracts simply by 





The courts’ analyses in McCain and Barton suggest a way 
to reconcile the apparent tension between the principles of 
autonomy and fairness in the context of domestic contracts. 
The above two-pronged approach ensures that parties 
involved in domestic contractual bargaining are truly 
autonomous. This safeguards Hartshorne’s effort to 
preserve individual autonomy while simultaneously 
making space for LeVan’s concern for fairness, thus 
finding harmony amid two principles that at first glance 
seem diametrically opposed.  
